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Abstract
The development of a sense of agency is indispensable for a cognitive entity (biological or artificial) to become a cognitive
agent. In developmental psychology, researchers have taken inspiration from adult cognitive psychology and neuroscience
literature and use the comparator model to assess the presence of a sense of agency in early infancy. Similarly, robotics
researchers have taken components of the proposed mechanism in attempts to build a sense of agency into artificial sys-
tems. In this article, we identify an invalidating theoretical flaw in the reasoning underlying this conversion from adult
studies to developmental science and cognitive systems research, rooted in an oversight in the conceptualization of the
comparator model as currently used in experimental practice. In these experiments, the emphasis has been put solely on
testing for a match between predicted and observed sensory consequences. We argue that the match by itself can exclu-
sively generate a simple categorization or a representation of equality between predicted and observed sensory consequen-
ces, both of which are insufficient to generate the causal representations required for a sense of agency. Consequently, the
comparator model, as it has been described in the context of the sense of agency and as it is commonly used in experimen-
tal designs, is insufficient to generate the sense of agency: infants and robots require more than developing the ability to
match predicted and observed sensory consequences for a sense of agency. We conclude with outlining possible solutions
and future directions for researchers in developmental science and artificial intelligence.
Key words: sense of agency; infancy; developmental cognitive science; developmental robotics; comparator model; artificial
intelligence
Introduction
It is common practice in fields such as developmental science
and robotics to use models proposed in cognitive (neuro)science
as a starting point for setting up experiments to test for specific
cognitive capacities or implement them artificially (e.g. Banks
and Salapatek 1981; Johnson 1997; Burghart et al. 2005;
Shanahan 2006; Qiao et al. 2016). However, an extrapolation of
theories and measures designed for non-clinical adults to
infants or robots has important caveats. One weakness is that
the transfer presupposes that the mechanisms captured by the
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models used in adult research are “explanatory” of the capacity
in general—i.e., that a model can, through its components and
the interaction of processes between these components, ac-
count for the entire phenomenon of interest (Bechtel 2009)—
rather than “descriptive” of a condition under which the capac-
ity might occur. In this article, we demonstrate the consequen-
ces of this particular caveat using the sense of agency (i.e. the
experience of oneself as a causal agent) as example for a cogni-
tive capacity. Our analysis focuses on the mechanism proposed
in the comparator model as a suggested mechanism within the
context of a sense of agency in particular.
The type of analysis we are undertaking is relevant for any
population in which the presence of the full range of cognitive
capacities of an adult human cannot be automatically assumed,
either because they might not yet have developed or matured
(as is the case, for instance, in infants), or because they have not
yet been successfully implemented (as might be the case in arti-
ficial systems). For both types of populations, similar caution is
required with regards to whether mechanisms originally pro-
posed on the basis of adult research can account for the entire
phenomenon. A cognitive process in adults may draw upon ad-
ditionally available capacities, whose presence cannot tacitly be
assumed in the aforementioned populations—introducing a
need to explicitly account for them in the corresponding mod-
els. In that light, in what follows, the comparator model—or,
more precisely, the way in which it is used in experimental and
implementational practice—is put under scrutiny. We demon-
strate that without sufficient evaluation as to whether the
mechanism in its proposed form can entirely explain, and thus
generate, a sense of agency, interpreting the evidence for this
mechanism in infants in the same way as in an adult popula-
tion can lead to incorrect conclusions. Moreover, the explana-
tory value of the mechanism directly reflects upon the
usefulness of implementing the mechanism in an artificial
agent in order to bring about the phenomenon of interest.
Assessing the explanatory value of a mechanism is thus essen-
tial to ensure valid conclusions and to provide solid foundations
for subsequent research lines.
The Comparator Model and Its Application in
Research
The sense of agency refers to the experience of oneself as an
agent who can cause events by acting. This experience is closely
linked to the ability to distinguish events caused by one’s own
actions from those caused by other agents or external forces
(see for review David et al. 2008; Chambon et al. 2014; see for
meta-analysis of the neural underpinnings Sperduti et al. 2011).
The experience of agency in turn is an essential aspect of social
behavior, self-awareness, and causal learning (Lagnado and
Sloman 2002; David et al. 2008; David 2012). It has been postu-
lated that the ability to attribute events to oneself or to others
can be explained by the comparator model, which is rooted the-
ories of motor control (Blakemore et al. 2002; see also Fig. 1). For
action selection and action awareness, two types of internal
models are used: an inverse model to select the action that will
(most likely) lead to the desired goal and a forward model to
monitor the ongoing process and its final result by comparing
the sensory information to the predicted state (see Wolpert and
Kawato 1998 for a formalized description of these processes).
The sensory prediction is thought to be based on the efferent
signals (i.e. the motor command) and is compared to the affer-
ent sensory signals. According to the comparator model theory
of the sense of agency, whenever the prediction and the actual
outcome “match” (i.e. are congruent), it is assumed that this
sends a cue for people to experience a sense of agency (e.g.
Gallagher 2000; Jeannerod 2009). The experienced agency is
largely dependent on the degree of congruence versus incongru-
ence between the predicted and actual sensory outcomes (Sato
and Yasuda 2005).
Before assessing the comparator model as an explanatory
model for the sense of agency, it is useful to understand its
background. The comparator model was not originally sug-
gested as a model for sense of agency but as a physiological
mechanism of sensorimotor control. As early as 1950, two stud-
ies were published demonstrating the role of efference signals
(also known as efference copy or corollary discharge) in moni-
toring and optimizing motor control (Sperry 1950; Von Holst and
Mittelstaedt 1950). A comparison between efference (i.e. motor)
and reafference (i.e. sensory) signals was proposed as a physio-
logical cue to classify signals as self-produced or externally pro-
duced. These empirical findings have been further investigated
and theoretically expanded (e.g. Wolpert and Kawato 1998).
Currently, a large body of empirical evidence supports the com-
parator model as a model for mechanisms of sensorimotor con-
trol (e.g. Miall and Wolpert 1996; Sabes 2000; Wolpert and
Flanagan 2001; Shadmehr et al. 2010).
More recently, the comparator model has been extended to
also serve as a neurocognitive model of the sense of agency
(Frith et al. 2000; Gallagher 2000; Frith 2005; Jeannerod 2009). The
validity of this claim has been tested in many psychological and
neuroscientific experiments with adults (e.g. Fourneret and
Jeannerod 1998; Farrer et al. 2003, 2004). In these studies, partici-
pants perform an action while monitoring the effects on a com-
puter screen. The observed effect is manipulated such that it
violates the temporal or spatial contingency to the participant’s
action, and participants are asked to judge whether they pro-
duced the observed effect. They tend to judge the effects as be-
ing externally generated (i.e. they feel reduced or no agency
regarding the movement) more often when the manipulation is
stronger. This judgment is commonly thought to be made
through assessing the action-outcome contingency by compar-
ing the predicted sensory consequence based on the efferent
signals to the observed sensory feedback based on the reaffer-
ent signals. Moreover, testing for the importance of efferent sig-
nals, Tsakiris et al. (2005) found that when the participants’
fingers were being moved and only visual afferent signals were
available, participants had more difficulty recognizing the dis-
played hand as their own, and as such their self-recognition
performance decreased drastically. This was taken to be indica-
tive of the key contribution of efferent signals (for an overview
of experiments investigating the sense of agency in adults, see
David et al. 2008).
Following adult research, the ability to detect a match be-
tween the predicted and actual sensory consequences of an ac-
tion has also been taken as an indication for an emerging sense
of agency in early infancy. In order to investigate infants’ capac-
ity to detect whether the consequences of an action are as they
predicted, several researchers (e.g. Bahrick and Watson 1985;
Rochat and Morgan 1995, 1998) conducted experiments in which
infants saw their own legs projected on a screen in real time
and on another screen, positioned directly next to the first one,
a distorted (e.g. mirrored) projection of their legs or the projec-
tion of another infant’s legs. In these studies, researchers found
differences in infants’ looking behavior to the contingent and
non-contingent displays of their legs. These studies showed
that infants as young as 3 months of age differentiate between
the contingent and non-contingent displays and thus display
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sensitivity to the degree to which the sensory consequences
match the motor signals they send out.
More recently, Watanabe and Taga (2011) and Kelso (2016)
have argued that the developing sense of agency can be demon-
strated using the so-called mobile-paradigm. In this paradigm,
originally used to study memory retention, the infant’s limb is
tethered to an overhead mobile such that when the infant
moves the connected limb causes contingent movement of the
mobile (Rovee and Rovee 1969). Infants react to this contingency
by increasing their movement frequency (e.g. Watson 1972;
Rovee-Collier et al. 1978; Heathcock et al. 2004, 2005; Watanabe
and Taga 2006, 2011), which has been taken as an indication
that they have learned the causal action-effect relation (Watson
1972, 1981; Gergely and Watson 1999; Watanabe and Taga 2006,
2011; Kelso 2016). This finding of an increase in action fre-
quency when the action elicits a contingent effect is in line with
previous work by Rochat and Striano (1999), who argue that the
infant’s explorative reaction to contingent effects can be taken
as evidence for the emergence of a sense of agency. These
experiments and their interpretations serve as examples giving
evidence that contingency detection has hitherto been taken as
primary cognitive indicator for the sense of agency in research
investigating its early emergence.
Inspired by the comparator model as a proposed mechanism
for the sense of agency in developmental psychology and cogni-
tive neuroscience, developmental robotics researchers have
taken implementations of the model as a way to imbue artificial
agents with a sense of agency. In an approach collapsing sense
of agency, sense of body-ownership, and sense of selfhood, Pitti
et al. (2009) equipped a head-neck-eyes robot with the ability to
detect contingencies in sensorimotor networks using an artifi-
cial neural network that models spike timing-dependent synap-
tic plasticity (STDP) as observed in the central nervous system.
STDP models the process of Hebbian learning and the constitu-
ent change in connection strength between pre- and postsynap-
tic neurons, taking into account the need for the presynaptic
neuron to fire before the postsynaptic neuron to establish
proper temporal dynamics corresponding to the ascribed causal
connection. The resulting neural architecture implemented by
Pitti et al. (2009) represented the system’s self-produced visuo-
motor information, making the detection of sensorimotor con-
tingencies possible by inspecting the clusters of neurons whose
connections had been strengthened by a reinforcement learning
algorithm. Over time, congruent sensorimotor neural pairs are
reinforced, whilst incongruent ones are weakened and eventu-
ally inhibited. This gives rise to representations of sensorimotor
contingencies that allow the system to anticipate ongoing sen-
sorimotor activity and predict the system’s next sensory input
[albeit limiting them to what the authors call “the here and
now” (Pitti et al. 2009, p. 87)]. As a consequence, the robot started
to act upon the sensorimotor contingencies, which the authors
took to represent one of the most basic levels of self-awareness
and thereby, in their reading, a sense of agency (with the neural
dynamics coherence, i.e., the rate of correct and comprehensive
predictions of the actual state, as associated quantitative
measure).
Other implementations of the sense of agency in artificial
systems were based on previous findings that organisms atten-
uate predicted incoming sensory signals. The rationale behind
sensory attenuation is that predictable signals require less at-
tention than unexpected signals and are therefore processed
differently, resulting in reduced perceptual intensity
(Blakemore et al. 1999). Since self-produced signals tend to be
maximally predictable, Schillaci et al. created an artificial sys-
tem that could use the prediction of self-produced auditory sig-
nals in a sensory attenuation process (Bechtle et al. 2016; Pico
et al. 2016; Schillaci et al. 2016). In their series of studies, the
researchers implemented a mechanism to classify self-
produced and externally produced signals in a robot. They
showed that the system processes the externally produced au-
ditory signals as more salient and uses the predictions gener-
ated by the comparator model to filter out the self-produced
signals.
In sum, researchers from various disciplines have so far fol-
lowed adult research in focusing on the detection of the match
between the predicted and observed sensory consequences of
an action as indicator for a sense of agency. However, this focus
crucially relies on the tacit assumption that the sole presence of
Figure 1. A schematic overview of the comparator model [adapted from David et al. (2008)].
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match detection is sufficient to generate the sense of agency. In
the remainder of this article, we take a step back and evaluate
whether the detection of a match has sufficient explanatory
value to conclusively investigate the emergence of a sense of
agency in infant development or as a blueprint for a sense of
agency mechanism in a robot. In our analysis, we do not focus
specifically on the assumptions made by the comparator model
(e.g. in motor control research) but rather on how the compara-
tor model has been applied cross-disciplinarily in experiments
and robotic implementations in the context of the sense of
agency. The main question for our conceptual analysis is
whether the matching mechanism of the comparator model is
sufficient to produce a sense of agency. As stated initially, this
sufficiency is crucial, as developmental researchers and roboti-
cists cannot take for granted at the time of the experiment that
any other potentially necessary components have already de-
veloped or been built in, so as to complement the mechanism
such that it carries out all requisite processes for a sense of
agency.
Analysis of the Explanatory Value of the
Comparator Model
It may seem intuitive to consider a mechanism that classifies
self-produced from externally produced signals to be able to
generate a sense of agency. However, we argue that even if a
system can differentiate between signals that have been self or
externally produced, this is not necessarily sufficient for a sense
of agency. Moreover, we subsequently argue that even in cases
where the match represents information based on the compari-
son between the predicted and observed consequence going be-
yond a simple categorization, this is still not sufficient for the
model to be explanatory of the phenomenon.
Parts of this confusion may have their roots in the way the
comparator model’s relation to a sense of agency is verbalized.
For instance, David et al. (2008) described the relation as follows:
“Thereby, the sense of agency particularly hinges on the for-
ward model, which uses an efference copy, that is, a copy of a
motor command predicting respective sensory consequences.
Accordingly, congruence of the predicted with the actual conse-
quence, then, supposedly would lead to the attribution of the
sense of agency to oneself, whereas incongruence would indi-
cate another agent as the cause of an action.” (p. 524) Although
this description might be accurate (i.e. in the condition in which
a match is detected, a sense of agency is assumed to occur in a
population that has already developed the capacity for the ex-
perience), it may not be a description of an explanatory mecha-
nism that contains all components required to bring about the
sense of agency; it remains agnostic about the processes that
give rise to it. In adults, many more processes may be involved
to give rise to the experience but are implicitly assumed by the
researcher as already present and, thus, are not studied. In
infants however, we cannot assume all adult cognitive capaci-
ties to already have developed and thus should not be looking
for a single necessary mechanism if we aim to study the pres-
ence or emergence of a capacity. Finding evidence for a
necessary mechanism means obtaining evidence for an indis-
pensable subcomponent of the capacity, but it does not auto-
matically mean that all required processes have developed.
Although the capacity of interest does not exist without the
necessary mechanism, the presence of the necessary mecha-
nism is not sufficient for the presence of the phenomenon of in-
terest. Rather, the presence of a capacity can only be inferred
from evidence for a sufficient mechanism. The comparator
model would represent a “necessary” mechanism if (1) the com-
parator model described a condition under which the sense of
agency occurs and (2) this condition must always be met for this
population to experience their agency [though see Synofzik
et al. (2008) for criticism targeting the necessity of the compara-
tor mechanism for the sense of agency]. However, for a mecha-
nism to be explanatory it must be “sufficient” to account for the
entire phenomenon (Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2005; Bechtel
2009). That is, the mechanism must be able to produce the cog-
nitive phenomenon of interest, in this case the sense of agency,
by virtue of its processes and subcomponents. In contrast to
previous work, which evaluated the necessity of the comparator
mechanism (e.g. Synofzik et al. 2008), the question we address
reaches farther, asking whether the comparator model, and
specifically the matching component, represents a sufficient
mechanism that can account for the sense of agency.
A clear description or definition of a sense of agency is re-
quired to assess the sufficiency of the comparator model.
Although various slightly different definitions have been used
in the literature [e.g. the feeling that I cause my actions
(Gallagher 2000), the feeling of intending and executing my
actions (Tsakiris and Haggard 2005), the feeling that I cause
events through my actions (Haggard and Chambon 2012)], a
minimal definition that fits the comparator model as used in
experimental paradigms defines the sense of agency as a result
of individual actions and their direct consequences, namely the
feeling that my action caused an event in the outside world (Haggard
2005). Within the scope of this article, we use this definition of a
sense of agency because the comparator mechanism functions
by virtue of a motor signal (generating action a) and the subse-
quent sensory consequences (the occurrence and detection of
the predicted event e), which is then assumed to lead to a sense
of agency. If the comparator model is sufficient for any type of
sense of agency, it would be for the one corresponding to this
definition (see also Wong 2012).
Following from this definition, several subcomponents of a
sense of agency can be identified. Namely, the sense of agency
requires an internal representation of an action by the agent (an
ownership predicate), a perceived event and an inferred causal
relation between the two. Additionally, to account for the corre-
sponding feeling, a phenomenological dimension is required.
We will consider the latter beyond the scope of this article and
for the sake of our argument assume that an organism capable
experiencing a sense of agency must have the internally repre-
sented content such that it presents an event as being caused
by a self-produced action (e.g. Crane 2003; Chalmers 2004;
Bayne and Levy 2006). In the case of artificial systems, the ques-
tion of the possibility of phenomenological experiences remain
unclear on a fundamental level and will require significant the-
oretical work before becoming meaningfully addressable (but
see Zaadnoordijk and Besold 2018, for a discussion on function-
ally equivalent implementations of phenomenological states).
Also note that leaving the phenomenological dimension aside
does not reduce the generality of the presented argument,
which rests exclusively on the representational capacity of the
matching component of the comparator model. Thus, our rea-
soning holds notwithstanding the presence or absence of phe-
nomenological considerations.
As outlined in the Introduction section, researchers have fo-
cused on participants’ capacity to detect the match between the
predicted sensory consequences of their actions and their ob-
served sensory consequences. In order for this to yield a sense
of agency without additional steps, the match itself would have
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to represent the content “my action a caused event e.” The rep-
resentation of the content “my action a caused event e” presup-
poses the representation of causal relations (e.g. cause(a, e)),
ownership predicates (e.g. mine(a)), and relations between
them. However, the nature of a match is to merely code for an
equality relation: equal(prediction, observation). Detecting a
match may therefore at best result in the content of “the sen-
sory prediction is equal to the sensory observation.” However,
the representation of the equality relation does not express the
causal relations, nor the ownership predicates, nor the com-
plexity of the interaction between these, required for a sense of
agency; it remains fully agnostic to all these dimensions as it
expresses only and exclusively the equality relation. A subse-
quent process is required for the agent to go from the represen-
tation of the equality to a causal representation. The latter thus
cannot be accounted for by the matching process alone. A sec-
ond scenario that is even further removed from generating a
sense of agency is conceivable too: the match detection mecha-
nism may not even lead to a representation of the equality rela-
tion. After all, it may be a low-level categorization mechanism
that classifies signals as belonging to distinct classes of events
without generating a representation of those events as “sensory
prediction (not) equal to sensory observation.” If this is the case,
the mechanism does not yield any representation about the
content of the signal, it just detects two types of signals that are
different based on the presence or absence of equality between
prediction and observation but, unlike the previous scenario,
without making such a representation accessible to the agent,
and categorizes them into two different “bins.” Again, one or
more subsequent processes have to be introduced into the
model, closing the gap from low-level categorization to the ulti-
mately required causal interpretation. The need for these sub-
sequent processes demonstrates that the match detection, on
which researchers thus far have focused, is by itself not suffi-
cient to be taken as evidence for the capacity for a sense of
agency. It may therefore well be that an agent’s comparator
mechanism functions perfectly, but without the additional in-
ference a sense of agency will still not arise.
Since the comparator model does seem to successfully cate-
gorize self-produced and externally produced sensory inputs,
can it then be regarded as a model for self-other distinction?
Unfortunately, we again argue that it cannot. The system may
have the capacity to classify the signals into two bins, but it can-
not generate the labels for the bins. Either one has to assume
that the labels have been obtained at an earlier stage or that the
labels are concurrently inferred through some other process. It is
possible that the match is taken as input to an inferential process
(as well as any additional cues such as proprioceptive signals),
but this requires assuming another mechanism in addition to
the matching mechanism, namely one that carries out the infer-
ential step. An action may produce additional cues, such as pro-
prioceptive signals, and the inferential process may indeed be
facilitated by the presence of these cues. However, next to being
a potentially irrelevant cue (e.g. one might move and receive pro-
prioceptive signals even when the sensory input was not caused
by them), the availability of these cues does not resolve the need
for an inference. This invalidates the sufficiency of the matching
mechanism for self-other distinction as such.
Some readers might argue that according to some accounts
of the comparator model, it is not just the match that produces
the sense of agency but the match combined with additional
processes. We grant that the “match-only version” may not
have been how the model was intended from a theoretical point
of view and that within the comparator model proper the match
is not considered sufficient to generate a sense of agency.
However, we counter that this is how the comparator model
has often been used and interpreted in certain lines of research.
This becomes, e.g., evident in artificial implementations of the
sense of agency when a system that merely learned to compare
its sensory predictions and observations is said to have a sense
of agency (Pitti et al. 2009; Brody 2016). Moreover, experiments
have been set up according to this interpretation of the model:
they tap into the ability to detect the congruence of sensorimo-
tor contingencies but fail to test for the ability to make the sub-
sequent inference that when a match is detected, the action is
likely to be caused by oneself (see e.g. David et al. 2008, for an ex-
tensive literature review on the use of the comparator model in
sense of agency experiments in adults). Developmental scien-
tists have designed the infant equivalent of these contingency-
detection experiments to test for the presence of a sense of
agency or body-awareness (Schmuckler 1996; Gergely and
Watson 1999; Rochat and Striano 2000; Schmuckler and Jewel
2007; Watanabe and Taga 2011). When testing adults’ sense of
agency, researchers tend to take this inferential process for
granted, but developmental psychologists and roboticists can-
not afford the same luxury.
In sum, while the comparator model might be valuable in its
theoretical formulation, our analysis shows that what we have
been considering in theoretical discussions, as well as what we
have been testing in practice, may not be the mechanism that
produces the sense of agency but rather a condition under
which the sense of agency is experienced if, and only if, all other
requisite processes have been fully developed or, in case of arti-
ficial systems, have been implemented.
Grounding Theory in Practice
In this section, we will ground the aforementioned considera-
tions by demonstrating their consequences in an example from
the domain of developmental robotics. The benefit of robotics
experiments is that we know what has been implemented and
thus do not have to guess about the available modules (and cor-
responding mechanisms) underlying the agent’s capacities.
This makes them more suitable for illustrative purposes than
infant studies, although it is important to note that the same
line of arguments holds for infant studies as well. As mentioned
earlier, making a first step towards building the developing
sense of agency in artificial agents, Schillaci et al. (2016) set up a
robotics study in which they made use of forward models to dis-
tinguish between self-produced and externally produced sig-
nals. In their study, the robot learned to respond differently to
signals that it could predict (self-produced) by attenuating them
compared to unpredictable signals (externally produced).
Providing insight into their reasoning of how these results relate
to a developing sense of agency, the authors state: “[. . .] our ex-
periment shows that prediction errors generated by sensorimo-
tor simulations are smaller when the proprioceptive and motor
information are coherent with the perceived ego-noise. Simply
put, sensory attenuation is more pronounced when the robot is
the owner of the action. When this is not the case, sensory at-
tenuation is worse, as the incongruence of the proprioceptive
and motor information with the perceived ego-noise generates
bigger prediction errors, which may constitute an element of
surprise for the agent and allow it to distinguish between self-
generated actions and those generated by other individuals.” (p.
396) As described before this conception of a sense of agency is
in line with previous work, but it leaves the open question: how
does the robot know the signals were produced by itself? It may
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objectively be true that the signals were self-generated, but this
is only relevant in the context of a sense of agency and self-
other distinction if the robot is able to learn that a match means
that signals are self-generated. (In reality, other contextual fac-
tors likely disallow the match and the self-generated signals to
have a one-to-one relation. For the sake of simplicity, we do not
take these into account here and only briefly mention them in
the discussion section.) As we see it, there are three possible
scenarios:
1. The robot does not know. It merely categorizes the two sig-
nals by virtue of similarity on signal level between the in-
coming signal and the predicted signal and the researchers
interpret the two categories as “self” and “other.”
2. The labels “self” and “other” were hard-coded into the robot
by the researchers. That is, the robot categorizes the signals
as in scenario 1, and assigns labels based on pre-provided
criteria.
3. The robot uses the match to make an inference about how
that match could have come about (namely, that the sensory
input was caused by its own earlier actions) and that the ro-
bot itself is a distinctive entity in the world.
In the first two scenarios, the robot merely categorizes the
signals into two separate bins to select the signal it needs to at-
tenuate. The sensory attenuation process is impressive from an
engineering perspective but not as much from a cognitive point
of view. There are many systems that are comparable to the
sensory attenuation task in that they can perform categoriza-
tion tasks (e.g. Leemans et al. 2002; Nawrocky et al. 2010) or use
properties of incoming signals as the basis for their next actions
(e.g. Bahdanau et al. 2014; Yeh et al. 2017). Still, these systems
work on a purely statistical basis, relying on elaborate forms of
pattern matching, without requiring an understanding of the
concepts they are working with. Similarly, the ability to catego-
rize self and externally produced signals is not sufficient for the
development of concepts such as “self” and “other.” Our argu-
ment is similar in structure and implications for concept learn-
ing to the core point made by Mandler (1988, p. 117), who wrote:
“We should not be misled by the complexity of these perceptual
processing mechanisms. They are sophisticated, of course, but
then so are the perceptual processing mechanisms of most
organisms or, for that matter, the industrial vision machines
that neatly discriminate nuts from bolts. To categorize incom-
ing stimuli into different types is a basic component of a percep-
tual recognition device; by itself, this ability tells us nothing
about the formation of accessible concepts that may be used for
purposes of thought and reflection. The industrial machine
may throw nuts into one bin and bolts into another (making its
choices by, e.g., computing the ratio of the diameter of each ob-
ject to its perimeter), but we would not want to say that it has a
concept of nuts and bolts.” One may now argue, as described in
scenario 2, that the labels may be provided to the robot at this
stage in its development, because equivalently infants may
have obtained the labels elsewhere during an earlier stage in
development. In this case, the “self” and “other” labels can be
assumed to be part of their knowledge, making it unproblematic
for the researchers to provide the robot with hard-coded labels
as well. Nevertheless, even if the labels are provided, the match
will only bring the agent as far as to categorize the signals into
two bins (similar to scenario 1) but now with labels on these
bins. As categorization does not automatically lead to a causal
inference, the match itself will still not generate a causal repre-
sentation of the consequences of the agent’s actions required
for a sense of agency.
Only in the third scenario would the robot perform an intelli-
gent and cognitively demanding task that could lead to a sense
of agency. However, in this case it is in fact not the match that
generated the sense of agency and self-other distinction but the
subsequent inference made based on that match. The addi-
tional inferential process is essential to generating the sense of
agency. Hence, in all three scenarios the match itself in isola-
tion is insufficient to produce a sense of agency. Thus, although
being a sensible first step, focusing exclusively on the capacity
to detect a match will not lead to conclusive insights about the
emergence of a sense of agency in developmental studies, or to
successful engineering of a sense of agency in robotics.
Future Directions
In the sections above, we have argued that testing for the pres-
ence of a match does not inform the researcher about the pres-
ence of the causal action-effect representation required for a
sense of agency. The causal relation between the action and the
subsequent sensory effect seems to be inferred by adult partici-
pants after detecting a match. This means that in our conceptu-
alization of the comparator model, this inferential process must
be added to reflect the actual processing (see Fig. 2). Making the
inferential step explicit in the model is important to show
which processes must be tested for in developmental science
and implemented in artificial intelligence.
Designing an experiment to assess the presence of a sense
of agency, for instance in developmental science, thus means
that researchers have to find evidence for the ability to detect
the match (for instance by demonstrating infants’ sensorimotor
contingency detection) as well as evidence for the subsequent
causal interpretation of that match. The presence of such a
causal model could be tested with measures of anticipatory be-
havior (see e.g. Kenward 2010; Miyazaki et al. 2014) or measures
of a violation of expectation. Infants’ prediction that their action
will be followed by an effect yields a strong indication that they
have built an action-effect model. Testing for infants’ causal
models requires research into what type of behavioral or physi-
ological markers indicate the presence of such a model.
Computer simulations of infant behavior in the aforementioned
mobile-paradigm recently showed that the previously reported
increased movement behavior during the connect phase (when
the ribbon is connected to the limb and the sensorimotor con-
tingency is active) cannot be taken as evidence for an underly-
ing causal action-effect model as the behavioral pattern could
be explained by a simpler cognitive mechanism (Zaadnoordijk
et al. 2018). These simulations pointed towards the disconnect
phase (when the sensorimotor contingency ceases to exist) as
the phase that potentially is better able to distinguish between
those infants who have learned the causal relation and those
who have not. Based on the computer simulation work,
Zaadnoordijk et al. (submitted) hypothesized that if infants had
learned the causal relation between their action and the mobile
movement, they would show indicators of a violation of expec-
tation upon cessation of the sensorimotor contingency. The
results of their electroencephalography (EEG) study with 3- to
4.5-month olds show that indeed that the group of infants who
showed a neural violation of expectation also showed an extinc-
tion burst (i.e. an additional increase and then decrease of
movement frequency relative to when the contingency was still
active) in their behavior. Both these measures suggest that the
infant has a prediction error about the causal action-effect rela-
tion, which they are trying to resolve with additional move-
ments. More experimental research is required to fully
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understand how these models are built and what their exact re-
lation is to the feeling of agency. Moreover, ideally, one would
additionally demonstrate that infants show a violation of ex-
pectation if the effect occurs in absence of any action as well,
but this form of causal learning may be too advanced in early
infancy. The mentioned measures have already been used in
other domains, making it relatively easy to apply them to devel-
opmental research into the sense of agency. This small change
to experimental designs would greatly increase our understand-
ing of the developing sense of agency in infancy.
For artificial intelligence, the consequences of an extension
of the comparator model entail changes in the implemented
cognitive architecture (or the learning goal) of the agent. In the
extended model mere contingency detection is not sufficient,
but instead the capacity to successfully perform a causal infer-
ence is required to confirm that the observed change in the
world state has indeed been caused by the agent as indepen-
dent actor in its environment. This in turn necessitates several
preconditions to be met, among others requiring the agent (i) to
have a model of the environment and of itself (so as to also be
able to perform a form of self-other distinction), (ii) to be able to
re-represent the information regarding the change in the envi-
ronment and the detected match in a form usable for causal
reasoning, and (iii) to be equipped with the required reasoning
capabilities to actually perform the corresponding causal infer-
ences. This ties into several long-standing research objectives
in artificial intelligence, including both high-level perception
(e.g. Chalmers et al. 1992) to bridge from the contingency detec-
tion to the representations required for the causal inference,
and causal modeling and reasoning (e.g. Shoham 1988; Pearl
2009) to perform the actual inference step.
It is, as of yet, not clear how agents develop from detecting a
sensorimotor contingency to inferring a causal relation between
their actions and the sensory effects, nor which components con-
stitute the sense of agency. We have made a case for the necessity
of a causal representation, but arguably the presence of a causal
representation alone does not generate a sense of agency. At the
very least, as mentioned before, an ownership predicate for the
action will be needed, and for the phenomenological aspect there
must be the capacity for phenomenological experiences. However,
this list is likely incomplete and more (theoretical and experimen-
tal) research is needed to come to a full understanding of the rele-
vant components and processes to the experience of agency. The
corresponding open questions will be crucial to answer for both de-
velopmental science and artificial intelligence in the context of the
developing sense of agency. They span various active areas of
work receiving significant attention from the respective scientific
communities. Advances made in any of these domains will play an
important role in accomplishing the difficult task of imbuing robots
with a sense of agency.
Discussion
Applying models obtained through experiments with adults to
research into the development of capacities in infants or artifi-
cial systems may have important caveats. Since cognitive ca-
pacities in adults have manifested in a full-fledged manner,
experimental research tends to focus on the conditions under
which the capacity is active or modulated. This research inves-
tigates a particular necessary condition or process associated to
capacities that have already fully developed and can thus ignore
other necessary processes as they can be assumed to occur. In
developmental science and artificial intelligence, on the other
hand, the research questions often pertain to what components
constitute the capacity and whether each of those components
are present (either through development or by implementation).
These investigations target the sufficiency of a set of processes
and mechanisms for the cognitive capacity. Directly applying
models and experimental paradigms used in adult research to
infant research or artificial intelligence can therefore lead to an-
swering questions about a necessary process while a sufficient
process had been the intended topic of investigation.
In this article, we showcased such a caveat in the context of
the comparator model as a model for the sense of agency.
Following experiments from the field of cognitive (neuro)sci-
ence with adult participants, developmental psychologists have
Figure 2. An updated schematic overview of the comparator model. (In this figure we do not address the case of incongruence between the pre-
dicted and observed sensory outcomes, although it is likelythat additional inferential processes take place after a mismatch to adequately at-
tribute the sensory information to a source. Moreover, the figure only touches upon the predictive components of thesense of agency and does
not consider any additional processes that might be necessary or sufficient for the judgment of agency. Previous work on this topic has been
carried out by, e.g., Synofzik et al. (2008, 2013).)
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turned to the comparator model as a starting point for research
into the development of the sense of agency. Against that back-
drop, we presented a conceptual analysis of the explanatory
value of the model for the sense of agency. In doing so, we fo-
cused specifically on the match detection mechanism as sub-
component of the comparator model tested in experiments
with adults and infants and built into artificial agents as a
means for them to develop a sense of agency. Our conceptual
analysis shows that the match detection mechanism postulated
by the comparator model is insufficient to produce a sense of
agency, as it lacks the capacity to represent causal relations,
ownership predicates and the complex interaction between
them. Although the model may describe a mechanism that
plays a role in the sense of agency, we demonstrated that what
is being tested in practice may not be the mechanism that can
explain, and thus produce, the sense of agency. This has far-
reaching consequences for current experimental research prac-
tice: As the mechanism lacks the capacity to produce a sense of
agency, experiments focusing on the development of this mech-
anism alone cannot lead to conclusions about the emergence or
presence of a sense of agency. Moreover, it means that one or
more additional modules are required when engineering a
sense of agency into an artificial agent.
This is not the first article that addresses the suitability of
the comparator model in the context of the sense of agency.
Another criticism of the comparator model has targeted the as-
sumption that the feeling of agency underlies the judgment of
agency that is often measured in experimental settings
(Gru¨nbaum 2015). Gru¨nbaum reasons that there is no need to
assume that the comparator mechanism, as low-level motor
mechanism, generates the feeling of agency, because the data
in judgment of agency experiments can be explained equally
well without ascribing this phenomenological quality to the
participants. He argues that since the judgment of agency is
partially generated by the comparator mechanism and can be
explained without the feeling of agency, the hypothesis that the
comparator model also generates the feeling of agency is not
parsimonious. Recently, Christensen and Gru¨nbaum (2018) fur-
ther questioned the explanatory value of the comparator model
by introducing a differentiation between broad and narrow
sense of agency. The authors argue that in the field researchers
typically treat the sense of agency both as associated to the vol-
untariness of movements (narrow sense of agency) as well as to
the consequences of those movements in the external world
(broad sense of agency). Conflating the broad and narrow notion
is problematic because the comparator model, if anything,
would be a model for the narrow sense of agency, but the exper-
imental practice tends to focus on the sensory consequences of
an action, which the comparator model is unlikely to be able to
compute (Christensen and Gru¨nbaum 2018). Our argument dif-
fers from Gru¨nbaum’s argument in several ways. Since our
article is partly targeting infant researchers, we are not as con-
cerned with the relation between the feeling of agency and the
judgment of agency, as infants are not yet capable of the latter.
Instead, we aimed to assess whether the comparator model
would in principle be able to generate the feeling of agency
(which we refer to as the sense of agency in our paper). Unlike
Gru¨nbaum, we do not conclude that the feeling of agency might
not exist as such, but that the comparison between the pre-
dicted and observed sensory information is not sufficient to
generate the phenomenal experience. Since our argument
asserts that the match in the comparator model cannot gener-
ate any sense of agency, the distinction between the broad and
narrow sense of agency is not decisive for our claims. However,
the relevance of the differentiation is clear from a mechanistic
point of view and any research into explanatory models of the
sense of agency ought to take it into account when formulating
the underlying processes and mechanisms.
Closer to our concern are the criticisms uttered by Synofzik
et al. (2008). After a thorough analysis of the empirical literature,
they argued that the comparator model lacks a conceptual division
between the feeling of agency and the judgment of agency. These
authors consider the feeling of agency to be a low-level non-con-
ceptual feeling of being an agent, which comes about through a
predictive process. The judgment of agency on the other hand
refers to the conclusion that one is an agent following a postdictive
reasoning process (see also Synofzik et al. 2013). The authors rightly
pointed out that the capacity tested in experiments sometimes
pertains to the feeling of agency (e.g. Lindner et al. 2005) and some-
times to the judgment of agency (e.g. Aarts et al. 2005). In their con-
ceptual analysis, they then went on to argue that the comparator
model in fact cannot fully explain either of these phenomena.
Their argument is based on two types of evidence. First, based on
the literature they observed that participants may self-attribute
actions even when there is a mismatch between the predicted and
actual consequence, and that therefore a mismatch is not suffi-
cient to prevent the experience of agency. Second, Synofzik et al.
(2008) argued that a patient study suggested that comparing the
efference and reafference signals is not always sufficient for a
sense of agency. Based on this evidence, they conclude that there
are cases for which the comparator output is neither a sufficient
nor a necessary condition for the feeling of agency nor the judg-
ment of agency. A related concern regarding its sufficiency and ne-
cessity has been raised by Mylopoulos (2017) who argued that the
sense of agency may be considered the default state and that only
when the sense of agency is violated, one becomes aware of one’s
agency. Since the default state is unrelated to motor activity,
Mylopoulos suggests abandoning the comparator model as expla-
nation for the sense of agency altogether. We do not believe that
the sense of agency is the default state, because there can be a
state of no sense of agency also in the absence of a violation of the
sense of agency. But even if one assumes that the sense of agency
is a default state, from a developmental and robotics point of view,
it is not clear how the acquisition of and development into that de-
fault state would occur and whether the comparator model could
play a part in this process.
An important difference between the criticism of Synofzik
et al. (2008) and the criticism presented here is that our argu-
ment holds more generally. Our analysis additionally covers
those cases, which had previously not been accounted for, in
which the match between the predicted and the actual conse-
quence leads to a sense of agency in typically developed adults
(i.e. what can be taken as the most frequently occurring
“standard case” of sense of agency). As explained above, not-
withstanding the existence of these cases, for principled rea-
sons the match detection mechanism does not explain or
produce the phenomenon. In this sense, standing on firm theo-
retical ground, we push the insufficiency argument further than
Synofzik et al. (2008). While their theory still allows for the com-
parator model’s match to lead to a sense of agency in certain
situations by itself, we argue that this can never be the case
without additional inferences. Hence, when researchers wish to
assess the presence or emergence of a sense of agency, they
cannot base their conclusions solely on the match detection but
need to also determine whether the subsequent inference is
made. Evidence for the subsequent inferential process would
demonstrate that the capacity to make this type of inference
has emerged and can readily be used.
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The importance of this difference lies in the consequences it
has for interpreting data from other populations, such as
infants and robots, in which a developed sense of agency can-
not be assumed a priori. As it has theoretically been shown that
detecting the match is in itself not sufficient to infer that events
are caused by one’s own actions, providing evidence that
infants can detect the match is therefore insufficient to con-
clude that they are at the same time able to use the match de-
tection to infer that they were the cause of an effect and, thus,
to experience a sense of agency. The insufficiency of the match
detection for a sense of agency naturally also holds for the adult
population. However, the problematic nature of it usually
remains unnoticed because in this population researchers (of-
ten without explicit mention) assume that participants are ca-
pable of making this inference and experiencing their agency.
Consequently, researchers do not attempt to find evidence of
the inferential ability; they are instead focused on the condi-
tions under which the subsequent experience of agency can be
altered (e.g. by violating the sensorimotor contingency).
In this article, we left untouched several other concerns re-
garding the comparator model as a model of the sense of agency.
For instance, it remains unclear what the nature of a match be-
tween the predicted and the observed sensory consequences
entails, what the relevant aspects and levels of detail are on
which the match is made, and whether different degrees to
which a sense of agency is experienced and the observed degrees
of sensory attenuation in the brain can be captured by a seem-
ingly binary match/no-match categorization between predicted
and observed sensory consequences. These are questions that so
far have received only little attention in the context of a sense of
agency, especially in artificial agents. Some of these questions,
e.g. about the binary nature of the match and its implications,
may become obsolete as researchers further incorporate the pre-
dictive processing accounts (Friston 2010; Hohwy 2007; Apps and
Tsakiris 2014) into this framework, shifting the focus from match
to degree of prediction error. Predictive processing allows for a
flexible processing and integration of cues and more naturally
accommodates for the possibility of graded experiences than the
comparator model as currently used in the context of a sense of
agency. The degree of prediction error could align to the strength
of sensory attenuation, better capturing situations in which
agents are unsure about whether or not they were the cause of a
sensory effect. The degree of prediction error can be modulated
by many different cues that are weighted differently in various
contexts. Nevertheless, an implementation or even a
computational-level theory of causal inference is still in early
stages (see e.g. Gopnik et al. 2004; Otworowska et al. 2016 for re-
lated work), also in predictive processing theories, and tractabil-
ity problems related to causal learning have not yet been
resolved. This issue as well as other questions, such as the rele-
vant aspects that are being compared and the levels at which the
comparison is made, remain relevant and need to be addressed
in future theoretical work. Moreover, the role that environmental
and situational context plays in the generation of the predictions
is poorly understood. Whether a match leads to a sense of
agency seems to be top-down penetrable by world knowledge.
This matter was briefly touched upon by Zaadnoordijk et al.
(2015) but requires a more thorough analysis.
Since the conceptual analysis of the comparator model has
shown that the match detection mechanism lacks the required
representational capacity, this opens up the question of what
type of mechanism can account for these representations.
Although an attempt to answer this question would be outside
the scope of this article, we think that there is promising
research into this direction worth mentioning. For instance,
Nagai and Asada (2015) as well as Otworowska et al. (2016) have
implemented predictive processing accounts into artificial
agents to learn causal relations between their actions and the
consequences. While these implementations are not yet able to
fully account for the cognitive capacity, they have the potential
to elucidate the type of mechanisms required for causal repre-
sentations. Closing the existing gaps in the explanatory model
will bring full understanding of the developing (biological and
artificial) sense of agency within reach.
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